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SBVBNTH JUDICIAL COURT
MERLYN M. HOYT
DISTRICT JUDGE
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COUNTRE

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LINCOLN

W. DAVID WESTON.

Plaintiff.

COUNTY OF LINCOLN and RUBY LISTER, LINCOLN COUNTY TREASURER,

Defendant.

A detailed explanation of the procedure which brought this case to this point is necessary. Prior to April 26, 1978, Plaintiff, W. DAVID WESTON, was owner of the principal interest in ten (10) patented mining claims located in Lincoln County, Nevada. On that date a tax deed was issued to the Lincoln County Treasurer, RUBY LISTER.

On the first Monday of July, 1975, Lincoln County property taxes had become due and payable. Notice was sent by mail to MERLYN BINGHAM, as title holder of record, at 216 Paxton Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah. The taxes were not paid and became delinquent on the first Monday of March, 1976. MERLYN BINGHAM was mailed notice of the delinquency. In accordance with N.R.S. 361. 480, the delinquency was advertised on the 17th day of March, 1976, in the Lincoln County Record. In accordance with N.R.S. 361.565. a Tax Certificate of Lien was filed in the Office of the Lincoln County Recorder, on April 26, 1976, giving notice that there was a tax lien on the mining property; and that if the lien was not

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DECISION

satisfied within two years, a tax deed would be issued to Lincoln County. On February 7, 1978, as required by N.R.S. 361.565 (6) (b) a certified copy of the notice was sent to GNOLAUM UNITRUST and MARIE BINGHAM, 216 Paxton Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah, and DAVID WESTON, and MERLYN G. BINGHAM at 216 Paxton Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah, notifying the proper parties that if the full amount of taxes were not paid in full by April 26, 1978, a tax deed would issue to the County. The taxes were not tendered or received by that date and a tax deed was issued.

On April 28, 1978, two days later, RUBY LISTER, as Lincoln County Treasurer, received a check from MERLYN BINGHAM for all taxes, penalties and interest. The check was returned. The check had been tendered before Lincoln County gave notice of intent to sell the property at public auction.

The property was later noticed to be sold at a public auction to be held on June 8, 1979. Plaintiff filed a Complaint on April 30, 1979; an Answer was filed on May 1, 1979. The auction was held and the property was sold to the highest bidder; however, title was not recorded because the County was waiting until the check for purchase was processed.

Two factors are of utmost importance:

- 1. Plaintiff filed a Notice of Lis Pendens with his Complaint on April 30, 1979;
- 2. At the auction on June 8, 1979, Plaintiff gave all bidders verbal notice of his claim.

Plaintiff filed an Order to Show Cause and Temporary Restraining Order Without Notice on June 14, 1979. It restrained and enjoined Defendants from conveying or recording title to the purchaser or from depositing the sums paid into County funds. It also commanded Defendants to show cause on June 27, 1979, why they should not be so restrained and enjoined throughout the pendency of this action. For good cause shown, time was extended until

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July 10, 1979.

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On June 22, 1979, Plaintiff caused to be served on Defendants a Motion For Preliminary Injunction; on June 25, 1979, Defendants filed an Opposition to Motion For Preliminary Injunction and Motion for Summary Judgment. Hearing was held on July 10, 1979

This Court in a Decision dated December 11th and filed December 12, 1979, denied the Preliminary Injunction requested by Plaintiff and granted the Summary Judgment requested by Defendant

Plaintiff appealed that Decision on January 7, 1980, and filed a Motion For a Stay of Judgment of the District Court Pending Appeal on January 14, 1980. On January 11, 1980, Defendant filed an Opposition to Motion for a Stay of Judgment of the District Court Pending Appeal. Included with the Motion was an Affidavit of RUBY LISTER, the Lincoln County Treasurer. That Affidavit stated that a Stay of Judgment would be unenforceable, because the Deeds to the purchaser at public auction had been recorded, apparently, the day this Court's Decision was filed.

The Nevada State Supreme Court in WESTON v. COUNTY
OF LINCOLN, 98 Nev. 183, 643 P.2d 1227 (April 30, 1982) reversed
this Court's Decision and remanded the case back to us. The issue
of law it ruled on was whether N.R.S. 361.583 (3), which gives a
right of reconveyance to someone situated, as was Plaintiff, for
either ninety (90) days, as specified in N.R.S. 361.603, or commencement of posting or publication of public notice, as specified
in N.R.S. 361.595, applied to patented mining claims. This Court
relying on the decision of the State Attorney General, A.G.O. No.
17 (March 25, 1973), had held that N.R.S. 361.585 (3) did not apply
to patented mining claims.

The Nevada Supreme Court, in reversing that Decision, did so in a manner that will help with the current controversy before this Court. The Supreme Court first noted that Plaintiff had tendered full payment two days after issuance of the tax deed

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RELYN M. HOYT
RETHET JUDGE
ROOM AND EUREKA COUNTE

and before notice of intent to sell at public auction; thus, within the purview of N.R.S. 361.585 (3).

Then the Court rejected this Court's reliance on the Attorney General's decision in the following language:

"We disagree with respondents' contention and the conclusion of attorney general opinion number seventeen, relied upon by the district court, that NRS 361.585 (3) is not applicable to patented mining claims because of conflict with NRS 517.410 and NRS 517.420. NRS 517.410 authorizes a county that has acquired title to a patented mining claim through operation of the revenue laws to grant an applicant the right to enter and explore the property. Additionally, applicant is authorized by NRS 517.420 to pay the delinquent taxes, penalties, costs and interest and thereby acquire title."

Defendants filed a Motion suggesting that an award of money damages, based on what had been received by the County, was the appropriate remedy to Plaintiff. Plaintiff responded asking for Summary Judgment against Defendants. A hearing was held on September 2, 1982, where argument was allowed, and some evidence as to value was offered.

An Order Granting Summary Judgment in Part, Denying It In Part was filed on June 17, 1983. That Order stated:

"IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants reconvey the subject property Plaintiff within ninety (90) days of the date of this Order, or in the alternative show cause why they cannot."

A comment needs to be made as to the delay involved from the September 12, 1982, hearing until now. As can be seen in the Trial Transcript of the September 12th hearing on Page 17 through 21, this Court has always been of the opinion that Plaintiff should have his property returned to him. Defendants have seemed to contend that what must be done is for the Court through its power to regain the property, as shown by a statement by MR. McGIMSEY



-4-

BCCA 64 PAGE 364

in the September 12th hearing transcript on Page 19, Lines 24 1 through 27:

"But my question is: Are they parties to this proceeding or does the County have to go out and reacquire the property with adverse possession -- "

Defendants were aware of the possibility that it could regain title and reconvey that title to Plaintiff.

We note that the counsel for Defendants, the District Attorney, had a change by election as to who held that office. This in part explains why no direct action was taken by that office.

However, we also note that immediately after swearing in the current District Attorney, we specifically advised her of this pending problem and suggested that she should look into whether or not the Defendants had the power to regain title to the property. We waited for action to be taken.

Finally, seeing no action coming, the Order filed on June 17, 1983, specifically ordered Defendants to reconvey or show cause why they could not within ninety (90) days of the date of the Order, June 13, 1983.

On September 26, 1983, Defendants filed a Motion for Extension of Time to Show Cause Why Property Cannot Be Reconveyed, dated September 13, 1983, stating the following reasons:

\*1. The district attorney was not aware of the case until some time after taking office and so was not able to begin to work on it earlier.

\*2. The district attorney has been under extensive pressure the last two or three weeks due to heavy criminal case

\*3. The case is complicated and requires a great deal of time to prepare.

We, in a last attempt to allow Defendants time to do something, gave Defendants until November 13, 1983. Defendants

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SEVENTH JUDICIAL COURT
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responded on November 14, 1983, in an Answer Showing Cause Why Property Cannot Be Reconveyed. That response addressed the issue of whether this Court should have ordered the reconveyance, but did not address whether Defendants could fulfill the Court's Order. It spoke of "improbability", but not "possibility", which was what the Court ordered them to show.

We suggested many times that the District Attorney take appropriate action; yet no attempt was made to regain title. Therefore, we ordered a final hearing to be held as to damages.

At that hearing the District Attorney suggested to the Court that, if given more time, she would look into various ways of recovering the property, such as a Quiet Title action or joining the current owners into this suit.

We note these protracted proceedings not to embarass the District Attorney, but to show that should the following statutory interpretation fail to be correct, MR. WESTON would be excluded from what the Legislature must have included as procedures to protect him or one situated in a similar situation.

For the reasons given below the Court finds that the deeds recorded in the purchaser at public auction for the mining property, which is the subject of this action, and all subsequent deeds are void as a matter of law.

We again note the nexus of the Supreme Court's Opinion in this case before remand:

"It is our obligation to construe statutory provisions in such a manner as to render them compatible whenever possible. "

The Court then analyzed N.R.S. 361.585 (3) in light of N.R.S. 517.410. It concluded that N.R.S. 517.410 allows a county to act in addition to, rather than in contravention of N.R.S. 361.585 (3).

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BCCK 64 PAGE 386

In this case MR. WESTON received a ruling that he should have his property returned to him. The county did not do what they had to do to take it away from him. Yet, they conveyed what appeared to be a valid title to a purchaser.

## N.R.S. 361.595 states:

"6. All such deeds, whether issued before or after July 1, 1955, are primary evidence of the regularity of all proceedings relating to the order of the board of county commissioners the notice of sale and the sale of the property."

Thus, as a deed was recorded, there is primary evidence that the notice of sale required by N.R.S. 361.595 (3) was given.

## The section continues:

"...but no such deed may be executed and delivered by the county treasurer until he files at the expense of the purchaser, with the clerk of the board of county commissioners, proper affidavits of posting and publication of the notice of sale, as the case may be, together with the return of sale duly verified, showing compliance with the order of the board of county commissioners, which return constitutes primary evidence of the facts recited therein." [Emphasis added].

WESTON, supra, said that Plaintiff had a right to either a ninety (90) day redemption period or a notice of sale as required under N.R.S. 361.595 (i.e., 20-day notice). That Court also held that he tendered payment before either. Therefore, the deed could not be executed or delivered; it is void.

It is the Order of this Court that the County
Treasurer deliver and record a deed to the property to Plaintiff;
that the District Attorney cause a copy of this Order to be served
on each and every owner of record of any interest in this property
within thirty (30) days of the filing of this Order; that Plaintiff
may still pursue further proceedings should he feel additional
damages are appropriate.

-7-

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SEVENTH JUDICIAL COURT
MERLYN H, HOYT
DISTRICT JUDGE
SITE PINE, LINCOLN AND EURERA COUNTIL



DATED this 9th day of January, 1985. SBVBNTH JUDICIAL COURT
MERLYN M. HOYT
BIGTRIGY JUDGE
HITE FINE, LINGOLN AND EUREKA DOUNTER
STATE OF NEYADA County Clerk
Jan. 31, 1985 UT 20 MINUTES PAST 3 OFCIOCE PM 21 BOOK 64 OF OFFICIAL INNCOLN -8th and last-64 PAGE 338 BOOK